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LINDA S. MULLENIX*
A few words should be said about historical research in procedure. Few words, indeed, are
necessary, for there isn't much to talk about.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Many civil procedure teachers who pause to contemplate pre-1938 procedure are
not unlike fifteenth-century sailors who contemplated a voyage across the seas. There
is this palpable but nonetheless terrifying sense of coming to the very edge of the
known universe, a point beyond which, as all sage souls realize, one falls into a dark,
abysmal void. And so, not unlike most happy fifteenth-century sailors, many
procedure teachers are quite content to hug the safe and familiar shores of the known
procedural map. Thus, not a few academicians have the same sense of pre-Federal
Rules procedure that ancient sailors had of the Indian subcontinent: as something
distant, substantial, ancient, quaint, and vague. And not unlike medieval tales of
exotic lands, pre-1938 procedural history has assumed elements of myth, allegory,
and uncertain lore, as the safe sailors repeat what little they have heard from fellow
travellers like themselves.
This Article is, for lack of a better word, a rumination on the importance of
being historical for proceduralists. So self-evident a proposition seems embarrassing
to assert; yet it is a concept now so much out of vogue, so academically d~class6, as
to require reaffirmation. How it is that history and its enthusiasts have suffered such
shabby patronization is no doubt an interesting subject in itself,2 but it is an inquiry
beyond the intellectual compass of this more modest essay.
History is important to proceduralists for reasons that are both obvious and
subtle. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, accomplishing the merger of law and
equity, require some knowledge and understanding of those two antecedent systems.
The rulemaking history of the Federal Rules is important for understanding the basis
and nature of rule reform, including the problems that required remedial solution and
* Judicial Fellow, 1989-90 (The Federal Judicial Center); Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of
America Law School (on leave); B.A. 1971, City College of New York; M.Phil. 1974, Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University;
J.D. 1980, Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed are solely the author's and not those of any
institutional affiliation. The Catholic University of America Law School provided summer financial research support for
this writing project.
I. G. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH tN CIVIL PROCEDURE 114 (1963) [hereinafter HAZARD].
2. For a recent lengthy jeremiad on the decline of classical intellectual pursuits in American education, see A.
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the thinking that went into rule amendment and revision. Certain procedural questions
such as the right to trial by jury, interlocutory appeal, and alternative remedies
require historical knowledge to apply the rules themselves.
But beyond the very apparent utilitarian uses of history in procedure, historical
understanding is important for other reasons. Doctrinal history of procedural problems
assists in broadening contemporary understanding of procedure. Thus, the current
debate over individual versus aggregate procedure is enriched by research that suggests
that theories of aggregate procedural justice are both ancient and not unusual. Research
into the history of personal jurisdiction provides bases for understanding the juridical
relationship between the individual and the state that are independent of modern due
process concepts. Historical research into the merger of law and equity has focused
attention on the primacy of equitable solutions to procedural issues, suggesting further
debate concerning the consequences of this historical evolution.
Furthermore, for the procedure teacher, pedagogical responsibilities require not
only knowledge of procedural history, but transmission of that history to students at
an early stage in their legal education. Unless the procedure teacher undertakes to
impart some historical content to issues and problems, the law student is unlikely to
acquire this basic historical framework except in a discrete course in legal history or
jurisprudence. Thus, the procedure teacher has the burden of setting the stage for the
law student's broader encounters with the law. Much of the substantive law that first
year students examine is imbued with procedural implications; the procedure teacher
carries the heavy responsibility of placing both substance and procedure in a historical
context that suggests the richness, value, and importance of that history.
This Article explores the influence of history on procedure and the efforts that
procedural scholars are making to impart some historical dimension to writing on
procedural topics. Part Two outlines the views of other proceduralists on the impor-
tance of historical understanding. Part Three revisits a twenty-five year-old study by
Professor Hazard on the state of civil procedure scholarship. That study found little
historical research being done on procedural issues, and it provides the framework for
an assessment of contemporary efforts in research on the history of procedure, con-
tained in Part Four. Part Five briefly discusses the major contemporary challenge
raised by metaproceduralists to the historical, traditional approach to civil procedure.
Finally, the Article concludes with some observations on the fine work currently being
done in historical research on procedure and the opportunities for continued projects.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING HISTORICAL FOR PROCEDURALISTS
The immediate impetus for this essay is the publication of the second edition of
Professors Casad, 3 Fink, 4 and Simon's 5 casebook on civil procedure. 6 While the
3. John H. and John M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
4. Isadore and Ida Topper Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
5. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
6. R. CASAD, H. FINK & P. SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter CASAD, FINK
& SINON].
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lieutenants and foot soldiers of civil procedure march determinatively on two flanks, 7
Professors Casad, Fink, and Simon doggedly advance (or perhaps retreat is the more
apt concept) according to their own conception of the field. Aware of the skirmishes
surrounding them, the authors (Professors Casad and Simon in the first edition;8
Professors Casad, Fink, and Simon in the second) have marched straight ahead with
their particular vision and commitment to procedural education.
The authors' conception is one that is highly traditional, doctrinal, and above all
else, historical. Their text represents an abiding and unapologetic belief in the
importance of history for the knowledge and, more importantly, the understanding of
procedure. If, as it has been claimed,9 so-called traditional procedure has lost
academic respectability and is in its death throes, then this text stands as a challenge
to that view. This casebook is, in a very pointed sense, a deliberate anachronism.
Professors Casad and Simon acknowledged this in their first edition, when they
very modestly stated: "It is our belief that some aspects of civil procedure can best
be understood-indeed, some can only be understood-as results of a historical
process. This way of approaching the subject has not been very fashionable in recent
years . . . . "0 Now, in the second edition, not only have the authors added new,
additional historical materials, I but they have become more assertive in the apparent
unorthodoxy of their orthodoxy:
[WV]e again take the position that the civil procedure course, perhaps more than any other
basic law school course, is history-driven. Students cannot understand certain concepts,
such as the right to jury trial, or the remedy of an injunction against the operation of a state
statute in a civil rights action, without knowledge of the development of separate courts of
law and equity in England prior to the American Revolution. Moreover, without a historical
dimension, the rules of practice that are taught seem to be self-evident and not easily subject
to change. Rather, we believe that students should come to see the cyclical nature of
procedural development-reform, followed by reaction, followed by further reform. 12
Professors Casad, Fink, and Simon clearly believe that the educated lawyer is
incomplete without this grounding in historical procedure13 and that mere rote
7. See, e.g., Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1989)
[hereinafter Mullenix, Metaprocedure] (reviewing the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik casebook Procedure); Mullenix, User
Friendly Civil Procedure: Pragmatic Proceduralism Slouching Away from Process Theory, 56 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1023
(1988) (reviewing the Crump, Dorsaneo, Chase, and Perschbacher text, Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure).
8. R. CASAD & P. SIION, CIVIL PROCEDUPRE: CASES AND MATERIALS (Ist ed. 1984) [hereinafter CASAD & SIMtON].
9. See, e.g., Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural
Vision, 6 LAw & HST. REV. 311 (1988) [hereinafter Subrin, David Dudley Field]; W. Eskridge, Remarks at the AALS
Conference on Civil Procedure (June 5, 1988). writes Professor Subrin: "The present espousal of such devices as case
management and alternative dispute resolution is both a sign of and a reaction to a procedural regime that is in question
and in decline, if not in its death throes." Subrin, David Dudley Field, supra, at 311. See also Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicator
' 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494 (1986) (same hypothesis). Although Professor Subrin's
remark is addressed to applied adjudicative procedure, this basic attitude about the efficacy of post-1938 federal procedure
is mirrored in a similar decline in faith concerning teaching the so-called traditional canon of civil procedure. Indeed, the
Cover, Fiss, and Resnik casebook Procedure represents a kind of failing faith in that traditional canon. See R. COVER,
0. Ftss & J. RESNtI, PROCEDURE (1988) [hereinafter COVER, Fiss & RESNIK].
10. CASAD & SIMON supra note 8, at vii.
11. See, e.g., CASAD, FINK & StON, supra note 6, at 399-430. This 31-page historical section on the background
of modern pleading represents a 25-page expansion over the first edition.
12. Id. at ix.
13. At the very practical level, the authors make the argument that through studying historical materials students
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knowledge of rules, while adequate, is intellectually shallow. Professor Subrin,
another proponent of the importance of history for proceduralists, has asserted
additional reasons for more careful study of the past.14 He suggests that through
studying history, we can "help dispel three different but connected misconceptions
about civil procedure." 1 5
The first mistaken notion is the idea that "rules simply arrived, impelled by
neither people nor ideology." 1 6 Professor Subrin, perhaps himself driven by a
twentieth-century realist comprehension of the law, would have us understand the
sociopolitical context and the competing agendas that give rise to rule reform and
revision. The second misconception is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
a logical extension of the Field Code, the nineteenth-century attempt at procedural
rule reform in New York State. This mischaracterization, when unthinkingly repeated
by classroom teachers, induces incorrect conclusions about the modern rules. ' 7 The
third mistaken notion is that nineteenth-century procedure, viewed as overly rigid and
formalistic, has "nothing to offer the current procedural dialogue."' 8 Historical
proceduralists flatly deny this proposition, and like Professors Casad and his
coauthors, Professor Subrin makes the point that "[h]istory also aids our recognition
of the apparent intractability of recurrent themes and tensions."' 9 Thus, he says that
"before embarking on new . . . paths, we need to reflect upon our procedural
ancestry in some detail," ' 20 a sentiment that embodies and reflects Santayana's
cautionary epigram.21
Perhaps the most eloquent affirmation of the importance of history for
proceduralists was stated by Professor Hazard some twenty-five years ago in his
benchmark study of research in civil procedure. 22 That unsparing report, which
succinctly noted the dearth of historical research on procedure, perhaps perfectly
captured the routine lip service that academicians to this day condescendingly pay to
historical research efforts: "It is commonplace to make obeisance to the uses of the
"should also be alert to the current issues and trends in procedural thinking, and the future questions with which they will
have to deal as members of the bar, in their bar associations, and as members of law reform commissions, legislatures
and the bench." Id.
14. Subrin, David Dudley Field, supra note 9, at 311.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Professor Hazard traces a similar sloppy reliance on pre-Field Code nineteenth-century procedural writings.
See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 116-17.
18. Subrin, David Dudley Field, supra note 9, at 311-12.
19. Id. at 312.
20. Id. at 311.
21. "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." G. SArrAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE
284 (Dover 1980) (volume one of The Life of Reason). It has been suggested that in certain substantive actions courts are
becoming more stringent in scrutinizing the sufficiency of complaints and that the essence of common law code pleading
is slowly seeping back into the requirements for valid pleading. This trend is ongoing despite the clear intent of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid the strictures of technical pleading requirements. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 8; see generally
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLurt. L. REv. 433 (1986)
(discussing the trend toward more detailed pleading practice).
22. HAZARD, supra note 1. Professor Hazard's study was prepared for the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of
Law pursuant to a request to make a "critical examination and evaluation of the research activities in the United States
which relate to legal institutions and processes." Id. at iii. His study was one of several monographs discussing the state
of legal research in several fields.
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past, to acknowledge that a page of history is worth a volume of logic. It is
uncommon to undertake to write that page.''23
Having accounted for the inaction and attitudes of his colleagues, Professor
Hazard offered this reason for the historical study of procedure:
Yet at the most immediate pragmatic level we know that any presently operative rule of law
is a three-dimensional mosaic, composed of pieces not only of varying size but of varying
antiquity. A plane [sic] rendering of the law does not disclose these irregularities; an
historical rendering does. For broader purposes of law reforms, the lessons of history are
second-hand lessons in life and when learned endow those who would reform the law with
a more seasoned confidence.24
In general, Professor Hazard's study of research in civil procedure is interesting
because it has preserved, amber-like, observations made twenty-five years after the
creation of the Federal Rules. The study, a historical document itself, marks the
middle of the modern procedural era and thus affords the opportunity to revisit its
themes as well as to assess progress and retreat.
III. THE HAZARD STUDY ON THE STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Professor Hazard reached four general conclusions concerning the state of civil
procedure research. First, little attention had been paid to the theoretical and
philosophical bases of procedure. 25 Second, most doctrinal research that formed the
core product of procedural writing was narrowly directed at legislative reform. Third,
empirical studies of procedure were still largely nascent, suffering from "exaggerated
expectation and limitations in the art of the social disciplines related to law.''26
Finally, "[a]lthough many contemporary procedural problems arise from or are
complicated by historical considerations, historical research in procedure has been
seriously neglected.' '27
Professor Hazard's study is a lengthy examination of these gloomy conclusions.
The current scholarly terrain, in contrast, offers some good news along with some
equally gloomy data. The good news is that empirical research has blossomed and
flourished with an infusion of talent and insight from quarters that Professor Hazard
correctly predicted. 28 The bad news is that procedural scholarship has largely failed
23. Id. at 115-16. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("Upon this point
a page of history is worth a volume of logic.").
24. HAzARD, supra note 1. at 116.
25. Id. at 5, 63-93.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 98-114. Professor Hazard observed that virtually no procedural research had been produced by political
scientists or sociologists, but he predicted that social psychologists as well as economists might make useful contributions
to procedural research. Indeed, he urged law professors to seek collaborators in these disciplines: "In summary, the
researchers in law of the near future may hopefully look to the sociologists for general help and interest and perhaps to
the economists on the points mentioned above. I have doubt that efforts with other disciplines should be seriously pursued
for the present." Id. at 106.
Since the publication of the Hazard study in 1963, numerous books, monographs, and articles have been published
utilizing empirical methodology or interdisciplinary perspectives on procedural problems. See, e.g., D. BARNES & J.
CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND PRACrICE (1986); H. KAI.vEN, JR. & H.
ZEtsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); E.A. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); M.
19891
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to progress in Professor Hazard's three other categories. Indeed, in the case of
doctrinal research, such efforts have fallen on hard times in the academy. And
notwithstanding the proliferation of flashy theoretical pieces on federal courts and
constitutional law, 29 hard-core civil procedure (as opposed to federal courts and legal
process) has failed to produce its philosopher. Then as now, Professor Hazard had to
borrow federal courts scholars to make the unconvincing case for evidence of
procedural philosophy.
It is somewhat more difficult to assay the fate of historical procedural research.
On the one hand, Professor Hazard's blanket assertion that there basically was not
much to talk about,30 happily, is not true today. But on the other hand, there seems
to exist a kind of pedagogical schizophrenia between teaching materials and scholarly
output. The casebook trend is towards evisceration if not total elimination of historical
materials, 31 while historical research seems to be enjoying a minor resurgence.3 2
Though not a cause for being overly pessimistic, this phenomenon probably
represents a net loss. When historical materials disappear from the casebooks, they
disappear from the classroom. In short, the tradition is lost; the historical context is
not transmitted; the next generation lacks the insight that informs past, present, and
future discourse. It is not enough to suggest that the historical materials are there for
the reading; the fact is that neither teachers nor students will take the time to read and
ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964); D. SAARI, AMiERICAN COURT MANAOEamENT THEORIES
AND PRACTnCEs (1982); M. SAKS & C. BARON, THE UsE/NONUSEIMISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (1980);
J. THIBArr & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975); D. TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FasrmFR, H. KRTnezE & A. Si.AT,
CIVIL LrnoATION RESEARCH PROJECT. FINAL REPORT (1983); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
541 (1978); Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401
(1979).
In addition, both the Federal Judicial Center in Washington D.C. (established by Congress in 1967) and the Rand
Institute for Civil Justice in Santa Monica, California regularly publish empirical studies of procedural topics. These
articles and monographs are too numerous to list, but catalogues of publications are available from both organizations
upon request.
The most prominent book-length treatment of legal issues from an ecoomic perspective has been, of course, Judge
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, which contains some sections on procedural issues. See R. POsNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 429-57 (3d ed. 1986). Again, the law-and-economics literature is now both vast and in vogue, with
too many titles to list. However, many procedural issues have provided the basis for economic analysis. See, e.g., Brunet,
A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV.
701 (1978); Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978); Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admininstration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
29. For example, one of the longest-running scholarly debates has been the ultimately unresolvable argument
surrounding the parity (or lack thereof) between federal and state courts. This round robin of critical commentary may be
traced to Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977), followed by Neuborne, Toward Procedural
Parity in Constitttional Litigation, 22 WN. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981), which spurred Solimine & Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HA.rTNGs CONST. L.Q.
213 (1983). For the most recent installments in this debate, see Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for
the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory:
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988) ("So much has been written
by both jurists and scholars over the last twenty years on the issue of state and federal court 'parity' that it has been
difficult to imagine at this point anything new being said or some important and original insight being discerned." Id. at
329 (footnote omitted).); Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor
Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369 (1988).
30. HAZARD, supra note 1.
31. For an extreme example of this phenomenon, see COVER, Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 9. With the exception of
an appendix at pages 1787-824 dealing with the promulgation of the Federal Rules (On Reading the Rules), this casebook
is bereft of historical materials. See Mullenix, Metaprocedure, supra note 7, at 1167.
32. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
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think about the historical materials. This takes time and effort, both of which are in
short supply for teachers as well as students.
And further, why should they take the time? Casebooks, in a fashion, validate
current intellectual consensus as to what is important to study. When the texts, over
time, de-emphasize historical materials; when professional colleagues pay ritual but
hollow obeisance to the value of history; when students habitually complain about
inscrutability or ennui, why then should procedure teachers seek out historical
materials?
Thus, although there is a renaissance of interest in historical topics, in truth the
proponents of such research are writing for a small, dedicated group of cognoscenti.
The procedural historians will not let the light go out; their labors lovingly tend that
intellectual flame. Nonetheless, the prevailing vision of the procedural future is
ahistorical.
This ahistoricism perhaps marks the culmination of a trend noted in the Hazard
study. There, the summary of extant historical research comprised six pages of a one
hundred-and-twenty-page report. 33 Approximately half of that discussion was de-
voted to reasons for the importance of history and problems with such scholarship.
The paucity of reported scholarship itself, then, speaks volumes for the historical
inattention to procedural history. Professor Hazard found that there was no general
study of American procedural history similar to Holdsworth's or Plucknett's books on
English legal history.3 4 This gap in scholarship substantially remains today, although
a number of studies of the common law have appeared since the publication of the
Hazard study. 35 Similarly, Professor Hazard noted that with the exception of a few
pieces, no scholar had written a systematic study of the origins and development of
American judicial and procedural institutions. 36 Again, the surprising fact is that in
twenty-five years, no scholar has yet written a good legal history of the federal courts,
a lacuna noted by more than one commentator.37
33. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 114-20.
34. Id. at 115; see W. HoLSoORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISii LAW (6th ed. 1938); T. PLUCKNETr, A CO,:CiSE
HIsTORY OFTHE CO .ON LAW (5th ed. 1956). Also noted as good sources for the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence
were R. MtLLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952); F. MAITLAND, Fonts OF ACTION
AT COMMON LAW (1936); and C. HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AtERCA AND HISTORICAL ENGLAND
(1897).
35. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1979); G. CALABRESI, A COMION
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CONItMON LAW (1988); L.M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AkmERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); J.H. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HANDBOOK OP CowIstoN LAW PLEADING (1969);
S.F.C. MiLso.M, HISTORICAL FOuNDAHnONs OF THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1981).
36. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 115. Noted Professor Hazard:
Professor Julius Goebel, Jr. has observed that the cause of American legal history has been ill-served by both
lawyers and historians. I have no doubt that this disservice is one of the prices we have paid for conducting
education about law almost exclusively in professional schools. The historian has difficulty penetrating the
professional milieu; the typical law professor's posture toward the history of the subject is to regard it as
essentially an extrapolation of the principle of stare decisis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. See, e.g., C. MCCOPstICK, J. CHADBOURN, & C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (8th ed.
1988) ("An adequate history of the federal judicial system would be an enlightening contribution. It has yet to be
written."). The sources on the federal judicial system noted by the authors predate 1953 and were obviously available at
the time of the Hazard study. Two books published since then, but not especially focused on procedural history, are H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrIoN: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); and M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
1989]
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Moreover, the Hazard study noted with surprise that with one or two exceptions,
no scholars had written on statutory procedural developments prior to the Field
Code. 38 If contemporary procedure teachers view 1938 as the edge of the known
procedural universe, then it seems that twenty-five years ago the falling-off point at
least extended to David Dudley Field. Indeed, Professor Hazard traced almost all
modern accounts of procedure to statements, restatements, and misstatements of
Justice Story's Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, a telling disregard for the
importance of history for proceduralists. 39
Finally, Professor Hazard observed that virtually all post-1938 procedural rules
were shaped or affected by precodification statutes "[y]et none of these historical
problems has been given the attention it deserves and should have." 40 Suggesting that
proceduralists in search of publishable topics might profitably explore historical
themes, he noted that such an endeavor might provide not only topics, but careers.
Unintentionally anticipating Professor Subrin's scholarship, Professor Hazard con-
cluded: "At the turn of this century, Maitland said that the common law forms of
action rule us from their graves. I think it can be said that the formulae of equity
likewise rule us today. They will do so until they are met and mastered."' a
The Hazard study of the state of civil procedure scholarship not only provided
a topography of types of research but also offered a rudimentary framework for
contemplating various institutional sources of legal scholarship. Four centers of
ALLOCATION F JUDICIAL POWER (1980). In addition, the American Law Institute published its Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (Official Draft 1969), which in turn generated critical commentary in the
academic literature. See C. McCORMIcK, J. CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, supra, at I n. 1. It is not insignificant that Professor
Hazard in 1963, and Professor Wright and Judge Posner more recently, must point to the 1928 Frankfurter and Landis
book as the classic historical study of American legal institutions and processes. See generally F. FRANFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) (cited in HAZARD, supra note 1, at 118 n.189); R. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORt 23 n.l (1985); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS I n.l (4th ed. 1983).
38. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 117.
39. Writes Professor Hazard:
Story's work, the only one of these that has utility as a source on equity procedure, is quite inadequate for the
purpose. It was hastily prepared, often uncritical, and, above all, unhistorical in that Story tended to treat all
reports of Chancery cases on an equal footing logically and chronologically. This treatment completely obscured
the uncertainties and contradictions that abounded in equity procedural rules and ignored the important changes
in direction and procedural philosophy that occurred in the eighteenth century.
Id. Professor Subrin has suggested a similar contemporary misapprehension of the relationship of the modem Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the Field Code: "[I]t is important to review the mythology that has clouded our vision. We
have been misled about the relationship of the Field Code and the Federal Rules, both by outright assertion and by
legend." Subrin, David Dudley Field, supra note 9, at 312.
40. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 117-18. Among the procedural rules that Professor Hazard noted as having been
neglected by historical research were the broad categories of joinder, including compulsory and permissive joinder of
plaintiffs and defendants; intervention; real parties in interest; cross-claims; counterclaims; interpleader, and class actions.
With the exception of class actions, see infra note 46, few of these topics have received thoughtful historical examination
since the publication of Professor Hazard's study. He also suggested that discovery, jurisdiction and venue, post-trial
motions, judicial control of juries, and appeals also suffered neglect from the historical perspective. Again, although some
exceptional pieces might be noted, see, e.g., Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law ofAttorney-Client Privilege: Privilege
and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (pts. 1 & 2), 42 U. Dsz. L.J. 105, 253 (1965) [hereinafter Gardner, Agency
Problems]; Gardner, Privilege and Discovery: Background and Development in English andAmerican Law, 53 GEo. L.J.
585 (1965), Professor Hazard's observation remains substantially true today.
41. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 118. See Subrin, Hone Equity Conquered Common Law: Tile Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law]; Subrin, David Dudley Field, supra note 9. Professor Subrin's two articles are portions of a book he is currently
writing on the history and ideology of the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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scholarly enterprise were identified: commercial law book publishers; the practicing
bar; public agencies for making and administering the law; and universities.4 2 Not
surprisingly, Professor Hazard concluded that the first three sources were limited
founts of scholarly production. 43 Again, this broad generalization, with some notable
exceptions, continues to be true today; the locus of historical research remains in the
province of the universities.
This framework is still useful and will guide the remainder of this Article, which
surveys the contemporary terrain of research in procedural issues with a particular
focus on efforts involving the study of the history of procedure. There is much to
celebrate here. Academicians have now produced noteworthy, lengthy books on
procedural topics, 44 and others are in progress.4 5 Even more encouraging, a number
of proceduralists have heeded the call to engage in thorough historical research into
contemporary rules.46 Another surprising development is the emergence of the close
contextual study of individual landmark decisions.4 7 Finally, although much histor-
ical research has been accomplished and is in progress, it is as true now as it was
twenty-five years ago that much remains to be done.48
IV. CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS AT THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF PROCEDURE
A. The Commercial Publishers
The first institutional source of procedural scholarship identified by Professor
Hazard was the commercial publishers; he found that commercial publishers, for a
variety of fairly obvious reasons, were not a likely source of initiation, support, or
42. HAzARD, supra note 1, at 20-21.
43. Id. at 21-45. In fairness, Professor Hazard suggested that much good work was being produced by organized
bar associations-in particular the research efforts of the American Bar Foundation-and various judicial administration
agencies. Perhaps because of their almost purely reportorial function, Professor Hazard did not view the commercial
publishers as productive institutional sources of procedural scholarship.
44. See, e.g., L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION I  THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYsTEt (1986); G.
CALABREsi, A COHtoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF SATrrES (1982); R. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POUCYZtAKING AND POLITICS IN
THtE FEDERAL DISmTIcr COURTS (1983); M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CoMMoN LAw (1988); T. FREYER, HARIONY AND
DIssONANcE: TitE Sttr & EmiE CASES IN AtRIutcAN FEDERAusm (1981); C. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY
AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); G. McDoWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982); S.
MILsom, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMttoN LAw (2d ed. 1981); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFOIp't (1985); G. POSTESIA, BENT Am AND THE CoMMosN LAW TRADITION (1985); M. REDIsH, FEDERAL JURSDICTION:
TErsI.ONs IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980); P. ScuUcK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS (1986); A. VAtSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW (1981); S. YEAZFL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LmGATION
TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). See also supra notes 35, 37 (listing additional sources).
45. See supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903
(1971); Yeazell, From Group Litigation to ClassAction (pts. 1 & 2), 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 1067 (1980); Yeazell, Group
Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977). Professor Yeazell's
articles formed the basis for his book; see supra note 44. In addition to historical research on particular rules, also
noteworthy are recent exhaustive historical studies on the rulemaking process itself, or on aspects of doctrinal history. See
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982); Field, Sources of Lai: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1986); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pts. 1 & 2), 14 CREIGTroN
L. REv. 499, 735 (1981).
47. See Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62
VAsI. L. REV. 479 (1987).
48. For a list of some topics in need of historical research, see supra note 40.
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transmission of procedural research. 49 This conclusion remains essentially true today;
the pure reportorial function that Professor Hazard described remains the primary
function of most commercial materials, and that function is not conducive to
encouraging or publishing procedural research. Also, market economics has demon-
strated that most procedural research, except for purely practitioner-oriented pieces,
simply will not sell, and commercial publishers are in the business of volume sales,
not the scholarly pursuit of truth or law reform. What is true for procedural research
in general has even greater force for historical materials; as consumer interest wanes
in the history of procedure, the likelihood of successful commercial publication
diminishes.
In the law schools, at least, casebooks remain the major vehicle for the
transmission of the canon of any subject, and Professor Fink has predicted that the
history of procedure will disappear from procedure casebooks.5 0 A review of six
current editions of casebooks from the three major legal publishing houses supports
the suggestion that historical procedure receives scanty, and spotty, textbook
treatment.5 1 The three topics most conducive to historical treatment-pleading, class
actions, and the right to trial by jury-receive, in most instances, brief introductory
discussion. Indeed, the history of the class action device is accorded zero to five
pages in the texts, and historical discussion of the jury trial averages three pages.5 2
49. HA&ZARD, supra note 1, at 21-28. Professor Hazard viewed commercial publishers as being primarily engaged
in data retrieval and reportorial transmission of legal information through such vehicles as law reports, digests,
annotations, and treatises. He observed that commercial publishers were unlikely to engage in the "'quest for more
satisfactory conceptions of the problems of procedure and the development of more satisfying answers":
I assume they do not conceive it their function to undertake these tasks, but only to perform the reportorial
function. This limitation no doubt is self-imposed on the assumption that their customers are interested in a
supply of answers rather than speculations as to what different answers there might be. And since that
assumption is tested in the market place, there is little reason to suppose that it is wrong. In any case, it is
difficult to believe that there will be any significant change in the pattern of operations by the commercial
publishers.
Id. at 28.
50. See H. Fink, Remarks at the AALS Conference on Civil Procedure (June 6, 1988) (entitled The Proper Role
of History in the Study of Civil Procedure); see supra note 31 on that prophesy fulfilled.
51. The six texts reviewed were not selected for any particular reason other than accessibility on this writer's
bookshelf, hence the highly unscientific nature of the sample and survey. The texts examined were: P. CAMusN"ToN & B.
BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
CARuINGTON] (Little, Brown & Co.); J. COUND, J. FRIEDFNTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SE~XroN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter CoUND] (,Vest Pub. Co.); J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIvIL PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter LANDERsS] (Little, Brown & Co.); D. LoUISELL, G. HAZARD, JR. & C. TAIT, PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDiERAL: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1989) [hereinafter LouisE.] (Foundation Press); R.
MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE, A MODERN APPROACH (1989) [hereinafter MARCUS] (West Pub.
Co.); M. ROSENBERG, H. SMIrr & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1985)
[hereinafter ROSENBERG] (Foundation Press). This writer acknowledges that the casebook that treats the history of
procedure in the most thorough-going fashion remains R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLEsstorr, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE I CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter FIELD] (Foundation Press); see id. at 299-419 (Part Two: The
Unitary Civil Action, tracing the evolution of the common law, the development of the system of equity, the abolition of
the forms of action, and the merger of law and equity). The book devotes approximately 120 pages to the development
of these themes. For a critique of this seminal casebook and its traditional pedagogy, see Eskridge, Metaprocedure, 98
YALE L.J. 945, 947-51, 962-64 (1989).
52. See CARRINGTON, supra note 51, at 1006-07 (note on the class action suit in equity), 170-73 (note on the
attraction of trial by jury); COUND, supra note 51, at 622-27 (history and philosophy of the class action), 812-17 (the
institution of the trial by jury); LANDERS, supra note 51, at 545-47 (introductory note to class actions), 703-06
(background note to trial by jury); LOUISELL, supra note 51, at 823-25 (historical note on class action suits), 1001-03
(note on the right to jury trial under the United States Constitution); MARCUS, supra note 51, at 266 n.3 (noting Professor
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In most instances, the edited case reports must shoulder the burden of explaining any
relevant historical context or predicate for the decisionmaking process.
The textbook treatment of the history of pleading is uneven, at best. Four of the
six casebooks contain historical discussions varying from two to eleven pages,
53 yet
two books offer lengthy, full-chapter expositions of the historical antecedents to
modern pleading.5 4 In short, as a percentage of total casebook pages, historical
materials rank very low; clearly, some texts have other fish to fry, and in doing so,
they sacrifice history to make room for different interdisciplinary materials.5 5 It is
difficult to assess whether the dearth of historical materials in the casebooks is the
result of disinterest, irrelevance, commercialism, or some other cause; the fact
remains that procedural casebooks are largely ahistorical and are becoming more so.
This trend extends to the gradual disappearance of whole segments of doctrinal
history. The ever-shifting sands of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, for example,
suffer a variable fate in the casebooks. The full-text reporting of Swift v. Tyson, 56 it
seems, has gone the way of the dodo bird. 57
To the extent that casebook presentation makes a statement about the professo-
rial conception of the discipline, the casebooks send the message that procedural
history does not count for much. The casebooks are silent accomplices in the
patronizing obeisance to history that Professor Hazard identified, and the texts help
to perpetuate a dislike, if not a disdain, for historical perspectives. These are the texts
and the thinking that are nurturing the next generation of the professoriate. The
question for the academy, of course, is whether this is cause for concern.
B. The Practicing Bar
Professor Hazard's second institutional source of procedural research was the
practicing bar, which he divided into individual attorneys and the organized bar. As
to the first, he viewed individual practicing attorneys as an extremely limited source
Yeazell's book), 433-35 (seventh amendment right to trial by jury); RosENBERG, supra note 51, at 538-40 (historical
development note on class actions), 796-99 (excerpts from A Sketch of English Legal History by Maitland and
Montague).
53. See CARRINGTON, supra note 51, at 733-44 (common law demurrer and dilatory defenses; the code demurrer
and its Federal Rules analogue); LousuE., supra note 51, at 18-29 (historical note on procedure generally); MARCUS,
supra note 51, at 109-14 (the historical evolution of pleading); ROSENBERG, supra note 51, at 611-13 (common law and
contemporary devices).
54. See CouN o, supra note 51, at 386-441 (the development of modem pleading and procedure); LANDERS, supra
note 51, at 347-95 (common law pleading, forms of action, equity, and code pleading).
55. See CovER, Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 9; see also Eskridge, supra note 51, at 954:
A more fundamental problem is the book's anti-historicism. Its focus on the "here and now" and its neglect
of background and evolution are striking .... The authors snub such useful historical materials as the history
of pleading, the evolution of law and equity, and the background of federal subject-matterjurisdiction. The book
boils down into capsule summaries the historical twists and turns of the Erie and personal jurisdiction cases.
This apparent anti-historicism is troubling, because the evolution of rules and doctrine is essential to
understanding them, and even to reforming them. Legal reasoning itself is a dynamic interaction between a
present controversy and historical texts (statutes, cases, and rules), and students lose this rich tradition if
argument is limited to current justifications for doctrine.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For the same observation, see Mullenix, Metaprocedure, supra note 7, at 1163-65, 1167-68.
56. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
57. See COvER, FiSS & RESNIK, supra note 9 (no full-text report of Swift v. Tyson).
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of research activity, with the tradition of the amateur gentleman-scholar disappearing
because of the constraints of modern legal practice.5 8 Again, this observation remains
true today, although (as was the case then) one may still point to the exceptional
instances of scholarly writing by individual practitioners. 59 Moreover, what is true for
procedural research in general bears relevance for historical scholarship; the
individual practitioner-cum-amateur procedural historian is rare, indeed.
Among the organized bar, Professor Hazard identified the American Bar
Foundation as the primary institution independent of academic affiliation that
supported and published procedural studies. 60 This tradition has continued, with the
American Bar Foundation Research Journal publishing many procedural studies with
historical content. 61 Thus, the American Bar Foundation has continued as a strong
source of nonuniversity-generated historical studies of procedure.
C. Public Agencies
Under the general rubric of "public agencies" Professor Hazard grouped
legislative bodies, rulemaking bodies performing a legislative function, and the
judiciary. In the first two categories Professor Hazard included state and federal
legislative committees involved in rule revision, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure of the New York Temporary Commission on the Courts. In
the third category he included judicial administration agencies such as state judicial
councils, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and judges and courts
themselves.62
58. See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 28-32. Of this phenomenon he observed:
In an earlier day, if the older law reviews are indicative, it appears to have been an important avocation of many
members of the bar to engage in research for its own sake. This seems to be less common today, in procedure
at least. Perhaps it is because the intricacy of the problems and the volume of materials make the task more
formidable, perhaps because of the press of business, perhaps because lawyers no longer consider themselves
as members of a learned profession in the old sense. Quite likely, sensitivity to the demands of efficiency and
the demands of business have thinned the ranks of amateur scholarship in law as in other fields.
Id. at 29.
59. See, e.g., W. FREEDMAN, FRivoLoUs LAwSUrrS AND FRIvoLous DEFENSas (1987); Gardner, Agency Problems,
supra note 40; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 133; Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan Agreements--New York's Approach,
1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 207; Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rav. 478 (1981).
60. See HAZARD, supra note t, at 34-36.
61. Beginning with volume 13 in 1988, the journal's name was changed to Law and Social Inquiry. The studies
and projects published in the American Bar Foundation Research Journal form a sizeable literature, and the reader is
referred to the indices of that journal. For an example of two studies that have incorporated a historical approach to
procedural issues, see Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority or
Restrictions?, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 143; Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 Asa. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 293. In addition to its own merits, Professor Brazil's article is noteworthy for its reliance on the historical scholarship
of another proceduralist, Professor Silberman. See Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I: The English Model, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I1: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1297 (1975).
The American Bar Association also now has a Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements. That
committee recently issued a report, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTRE AND PROCESS AFTER
A CETrURv OF GROWTH (1989).
62. See HAZARD, supra note I, at 36-45.
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Since these bodies were, in various fashions, involved with ongoing rule
interpretation, revision, and reform, Professor Hazard found them to be fruitful
sources of certain kinds of procedural research. 63 And these entities or their
descendants remain a source of procedural scholarship today. However, with the
exception of an occasional judicial opinion, none of these institutional sources
provides much in the way of historical scholarship. Since the publication of Professor
Hazard's study, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended several
times, and to the extent that every rule revision generates literature analyzing past
practice, the material produced by these bodies is "historical." But very little of this
literature delves beyond problems of immediate past practice or reaches back to
pre-1938 procedural history. 64 In that regard, the work product of the public agencies
has been as ahistorical as that of the rest of the research universe.
It should be noted that at least two public agency research efforts are currently
under way that may fill the gap in historical understanding of the American
procedural system. First, Congress has authorized a broad study of the federal
courts. 65 Second, although it remains to be seen how much of that institutional study
will incorporate a historical perspective, Congress in the same act authorized a legal
history project to be conducted under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center. 66
Finally, turning to the courts themselves, Professor Hazard rightly concluded
that busy, overburdened judges were not likely candidates to craft scholarly
procedural opinions. For whatever reasons then67 and for whatever reasons now,
judges are not productive sources of procedural scholarship, especially not historical
scholarship.
There are noteworthy exceptions; on occasion, a scholarly judge will recognize
the historical import of a legal issue and warm to the subject, producing an erudite
treatise on legal history. The most impressive recent example of this is Judge
Posner's opinion in Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,68 in which he
63. Id. at 37-38. Professor Hazard noted:
Suffice it to say here that much of the significant thought about procedural problems in the last 25 years has
emerged directly or indirectly from proposals for legislative change of procedural rules. The judiciary's
contribution to legal scholarship is made, first, in the increasingly important activities of judicial administration
agencies-judicial administrators, judicial councils, judicial conferences and like organizations-and, second,
in the course of the judiciary's case-deciding function.
Id. at 38. Such procedural research was not without its problems and flaws; see id. at 40-45.
64. See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE ALuusr 1983 AstENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING
EFtcnve CASE MANAGEuiErT AND LAw.yER EsPoNSIBILrrY (1984); Cooper, Work Product of ile Rulesmakers, 53 MINNi.
L. REv. 1269 (1969); Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363 (1983).
65. Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45
(1988) (establishing the Federal Courts Study Committee).
66. Id. § 302, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648.
67. See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 41-45. Professor Hazard stated: "But if a distinction is taken between those
decisions which add to the quantum of doctrine and those which yield new scientific insight, then it seems fair to say that
only a small fraction of judicial decisions are a contribution to legal scholarship." Id. at 41. Elsewhere he observed that
-[m]ost recent efforts to put decisional opinions on a scholarly footing have been by judges who were formerly
professional legal scholars.'" Id. at 42.
68. 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986).
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produced a lengthy analysis of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, 69 an interlocutory
appeal exception rooted in pre-Federal Rules procedure. Generally, the Enelow-
Ettelson doctrine permitted immediate appeal of an equitable stay of an action at
law. Not unexpectedly, this formulation led to much parsing of legal history in order
to construe what judicial action constituted an "equitable stay . . .of a suit at
law. "70
In a closely crafted opinion, Judge Posner traced the historical derivation of the
doctrine, its difficult if not sometimes bizarre application by the courts, and its
disfunction in the postmerger procedural era. 7' This historical analysis compelled
Judge Posner to summarize that "[t]he case against the doctrine seems . . .
conclusive" 72 and to hope that the Supreme Court would repudiate the doctrine. 73
Within two years of Judge Posner's consideration of the problem, the Supreme
Court did just that.74 In overturning the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, the Court noted
that "[t]he artificiality of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine is not merely an intellectual
infelicity; the gulf between the historical procedures underlying the rule and the
modern procedures of federal courts renders the rule hopelessly unworkable in
operation. ' '75 The Supreme Court reached this result by relying on the "extensive
and scholarly critique of the doctrine" 76 by Judge Posner, as well as the less erudite
but equally penetrating observations of other federal judges that the doctrine was "a
remnant from the jurisprudential attic," '77 "an anachronism wrapped up in an
atavism, ' 78 and a "Byzantine peculiarit[y]." 79
When confronted with a legal issue imbued with historical reach, the Supreme
Court generally rises to the occasion and recites what has now become high-level
boilerplate legal history. Nowhere is this more evident than in seventh amendment
right-to-trial-by-jury cases, one of the few instances where the Supreme Court still
relies on eighteenth-century English precedent. As recently as in Tull v. United
States,80 the Supreme Court was going through the uninspired paces of determining
whether statutory civil penalty cases were analogous to actions in debt in English
courts of law prior to 1791.81
Students, who can find little of relevance before their own lifetimes, are
typically stupefied to discover the Supreme Court agonizing over archaic forms of
69. See Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S.
188 (1942).
70. Olson, 806 F.2d at 733.
71. Id. at 733-41.
72. Id. at 741.
73. Id. at 742. Judge Posner stopped short of repudiating the doctrine in the case before him, largely for reasons
of stare decisis: "Despite all this we think it would be improper for this court to reject the doctrine." Id. at 741; see id.
at 741-42 (explanation of nonrepudiation).
74. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988).
75. Id. at 1140-41.
76. Id. at 1142.
77. Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir. 1973).
78. Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724, 727 (lst Cir. 1983).
79. New Eng. Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 189 (Ist Cir. 1972).
80. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
81. Id. at 417-25.
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action; more specifically, most think it absurd that the Court should be bound to some
old convention determined artificially by the date 1791. If nothing else, the
right-to-jury cases dramatically make the point that procedural history has some
bearing on practical lawyering; but it is sad, if not vaguely amusing, to read Supreme
Court briefs in right-to-jury cases in which attorneys struggle to discover ancient
analogies in ancient sources replete with ancient terminology.8 2
Although the Supreme Court episodically provides some decent procedural
history, for the most part, its procedural vision is as circumscribed as is that of the
fifteenth-century sailor described at the outset. The Court's view is very much bound
to the post-1938 Federal Rules and rule amendments, supported by their legislative
history. Since the Court's basic function is as ultimate rule interpreter, its statutory
construction is more likely to run to legislative sources than to any general,
independent historical analysis. Thus, the Court ventures into historical discussion
only to the extent that the legislative materials embody history as a part of legislative
intent.
When not constrained by statutory rules, however, the Court has not vigorously
seized the opportunity to locate common-law procedural doctrines in historical
context. The Court's repeated pronouncements on the attorney work product
doctrine, for example, illustrate this point. 83 In Hickman v. Taylor,84 the seminal case
on attorney work product, the Court could have traced the historical nonexistence and
unavailability of work product protection in pre-1938 litigation. This research would
have revealed few recognizable discovery devices in premerger procedure, with a
division of procedures between actions at law and equity. 85
Recognizing the cumbersome restraints on discovery prior to the enactment of
the Federal Rules provides greater understanding of both the liberal discovery
intended by the Rules' drafters and the need for protection of attorney work product.
In short, this small piece of procedural history helps to explain why the Supreme
Court first articulated an attorney work product protection as late as 1947 and why the
doctrine was unnecessary prior to that time.
Historical development of jurisdictional theory is similarly wanting. Especially
concerning personal jurisdiction, Supreme Court jurisdictional "history" essentially
means doctrinal history extending back to International Shoe.8 6 For many procedur-
alists this seminal case marks the point at which they, too, fall into the great historical
void. Yes, Pennoyer v. Nef-t7 is way back there somewhere, but most civil procedure
teachers would be hard put to offer a good, coherent discussion of pre-International
82. See, e.g., Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (No. 85-1259).
83. See, e.g., FrC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
84. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
85. See, e.g., Gardner, Agency Problems (pt. 2), supra note 40, at 287-88; La France, Work Product Discovery:
A Critique, 68 DicK. L. REV. 351,353-56 (1964); Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760,
765-66 (1983); Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery of Experts and Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1971).
86. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
87. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Shoe personal jurisdiction. More to the point, how many can articulate the legal
concept of personal jurisdiction before the ratification of the fourteenth amend-
ment?88
Research in procedural history closes these intellectual gaps; our cases and
casebooks do not. In turn, today's lack of historical sense and its concomitant over-
weening focus on the present distort the nature and function of procedural rules, lead
to false and misleading arguments about the proper role of proceduralism, and fail to
provide students with an adequate framework for contemplating alternative views.
D. University Law School Research
The fourth and final institutional source of procedural research-universities-
offered Professor Hazard the opportunity to inveigh expansively against the usual
litany of evils engendered through university-generated scholarship, 89 while at the
same time recognizing the high quality of many research efforts. Then as now, law
professors served on law reform committees; then as now, the universities functioned
as research centers for various procedural projects. Law professors still write (or more
accurately today, revise) the procedural treatises, and procedural casebooks, as forms
of scholarship, still appear perennially. Every criticism of the law review mill and of
the overabundance of banal scholarship applies with equal or greater force today. The
criticisms probably were not new then, and they certainly are not new now. The viral
expansion of problematic, trivial scholarship in the past twenty-five years, however,
cannot prove heartening.
Nonetheless, the good news is that in recent years we have witnessed a small
renaissance in the publication of superior research in historical studies. Some of this
writing has hewn closely to traditional doctrinal exegesis; 90 other projects have
ambitiously delved into pre-eighteenth-century sources. 91 At least one professor has
created almost a new genre of historical analysis: the contextual exposition of the
landmark case. 92 In short, these thoughtful and exciting efforts individually demon-
strate that historical analysis is not beyond the ken of the procedure teacher;
collectively these works reaffirm the utility and intrinsic worth of such endeavors.
This resurgence of interest in the historical examination of procedural topics is
encouraging for reasons beyond the standard arguments outlined at the beginning of
this Article. 93 Broadly formulated, this contemporary historicism serves several
important functions: (1) It affects procedural scholarship that is not primarily
historical in nature; (2) it supplies prototypes of historical scholarship that procedur-
alists can fruitfully emulate; and (3) it recaptures annals of legislative and doctrinal
88. See Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1939);
Whitten, supra note 46.
89. See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 45-63.
90. See, e.g., Field, supra note 46.
91. See S. YmAzELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLAss ACTION (1987).
92. See Perdue, supra note 47; see also T. FREYER, supra note 44, for a book-length historical treatment of the Swift
and Erie cases.
93. See supra Part I.
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history that, in turn, help shed new light on the transsubstantive debate over the
Federal Rules.
First, when one contemplates the effects of recent historical scholarship, there
can be little doubt that the importance of at least cursorily discussing procedural
antecedents has seeped into the scholarly enterprise. Even studies that are not
primarily focused on a historical treatment of a procedural problem typically make
some effort to trace historical roots through pre-1938 sources. 94 Indeed, some pieces
now derive their historical introductions from earlier historical studies.95 Nonethe-
less, even this brief, derivative historical scholarship is significant for its recognition
of the need to locate contemporary problems in past analysis.
Moreover, without overdrawing the proposition, a good argument might be
made that it is the duty of the responsible scholar, especially the critical scholar
whose purpose is to challenge the legitimacy of procedure, at least to locate procedure
in historical context. As has been argued elsewhere, 96 the failure to do this renders
deconstructive criticism a cheap shot at proceduralism.
Thus, although the typical, cursory historical survey that is incorporated in many
procedural articles does not provide a model for in-depth historical research, these
efforts are nonetheless laudable for their implicit support of the pedagogical and
intellectual values of such material.
Second, there can be no doubt that law faculty scholars have recently produced
stunning prototypical historical studies that not only contribute to the knowledge of
procedure but also serve as significant models of scholarship for others engaged in the
intellectual enterprise. The works of Professors Burbank, Field, Perdue, Subrin,
Trangsrud, Yeazell, and others97 have provided fresh legitimacy for historical
scholarship and have demonstrated by example that proceduralists need not be
intimidated by historical inquiry.
In particular, the works of these scholars are commendable, beyond the content
of their analyses, for their exploration of source materials not usually consulted by
proceduralists and for their willingness to take risks in comprehending, interpreting,
and assessing historical evidence. Just as perspectives provided by the various social
sciences permit legal problems to be viewed in new and different fashions, so too
does argument derived from historical sources. The conclusions drawn may be off the
mark, or flat out wrong, 98 but the exercise is worth the effort because it induces
94. See, e.g., Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of
Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 533-42
(1989); Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 748-49 (1987).
95. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 94, at 748 n.5 (relying on Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin
of a Procedural Phantom, 61 CoLu.s. L. REv. 1254 (1961); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967); and Reed, Compulsory Joinder
of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327 (1957)).
96. See MullenLx, Metaprocedure, supra note 7, at 1168.
97. See, e.g., sources listed supra notes 9, 41, 44, 46, 47, 88.
98. See, e.g., Kennedy, Digging for the Missing Link: From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class
Action (Book Review), 41 VAND. L. REv. 1089, 1114-19 (1988) ("One can argue that Yeazell expansively reads each
of the historic cases in order to justify his theory of Rule 23, when other explanations are also plausible." Id. at 1114
n. 117.).
19891
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
discussion and debate beyond the well-worn parameters established by late twentieth-
century proceduralism. And although it is a clichrd concept, historical research
teaches that truly new ideas are rare.
Third, many of the historical studies that have recently appeared have
recaptured certain annals of the rulemaking process, 99 or have retraced doctrinal
development, 100 in a fashion that should shed light on the ongoing debate concerning
the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. t1 If it is true that this is the
beginning of an era of new proceduralism, t02 then it seems a self-evident imperative
that we understand how and why the present rules were created, as well as the import
of procedural antecedents at law and equity. It is surprising to hear calls for new
procedural rules tailored to particular kinds of cases; this impulse ignores the strong
historical analogue to procedural rules rooted in forms of action. Thus, the failure to
appreciate the past may lead to the creation of new, ill-conceived rules, the
imposition of the rulemaker's most current normative theories, or the rejection of
process altogether. The failure to appreciate the cyclical nature of rule reform
endangers the larger function of judicial institutions.
The failure to recognize the historical implications of broad, systemic notions of
justice has been amply suggested by Professor Subrin's writing. Thus, Professor
Subrin closes his article How Equity Conquered Common Law with the sobering
observation that the conquest brought with it a steady erosion of formalism under the
Federal Rules:
Our infatuation with equity has helped us to forget the historic purpose of adjudication.
Courts exist not only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a way that takes law
seriously by trying to apply legal principles to the events that brought the parties to court.
The total victory of equity process has caused us to forget the essence of civil adjudication:
enabling citizens to have their legitimate expectations and rights fulfilled. We are good at
using equity process and thought to create new legal rights. We have, however, largely
failed at defining rights and providing methods for their efficient vindication.-3
Thus, Professor Subrin's close examination of the past led him to conclude that
today, perhaps more than ever, the equity-"engorged" system needs to revisit its
companion common-law heritage:
The effort to defeat formalism so that society could move forward toward new ideas of social
justice neglected the benefits of formalism once new rights had been created. The
momentum toward case management, settlement, and alternative dispute resolution repre-
sents, for the most part, a continued failure to use predefined procedures in a manner that
will try, however imperfectly, to deliver predefined law and rights. 4
99. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 46.
100. See, e.g., Field, supra note 46 (Erie doctrine and federal common law); Trangsrud, supra note 88 (history of
pre-fourteenth amendment personal jurisdiction).
101. See Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975)
(articulating the basic transsubstantive critique of the Federal Rules); cf. Hazard, Forms ofAction Under the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 63 NormE DAMi E L. REV. 628 (1988) (discussing transsubstantive intent of the Federal Rules).
102. See Symposium: The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1873 (1989) (papers delivered at Northeastern Univeristy School of Law, October 7-8, 1988).
103. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 41, at 1001.
104. Id. at I001-02.
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V. THE METAPROCEDURAL CHALLENGE TO HISTORY-BASED PROCEDURALISM
Finally, research into the history of procedure should help supply a response to
the metaprocedural challenge and debate that has taken center stage in the discipline.
The concept of metaprocedure, embodied in the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik text
Procedure,05 rejects the traditional rules-based proceduralism and legal-process
theory that have guided procedural education for the past thirty-five years. 10 6 The
exemplary casebook for traditionalists, the Field and Kaplan text, is now viewed as
old-fashioned, pedantic, dated, and wrong-minded. 10 7 Professor Eskridge, a leading
proponent of metaprocedure, has suggested that "[d]evelopments in legal theory and
education have undermined the cogency' 'os of the ideas on which the Field and
Kaplan text is premised; procedure teachers are increasingly restive with the Field and
Kaplan approach.' 0 9 The Cover, Fiss, and Resnik metaprocedural framework thus
marks a radical departure from the traditional teaching strategy for civil procedure
and its "most important decision is to focus on themes and structures of procedure,
rather than the history and mechanics of doctrine." '" 0
In truth, the metaprocedural approach is totally ahistorical and non-doctrinal, a
lacking that brings into question the validity of the entire intellectual endeavor. In a
brief passage reminiscent of Professor Hazard's observation that everyone pays ritual
obeisance to the importance of history, even Professor Eskridge acknowledges that
metaprocedure's ahistoricism is a "fundamental problem.""' But for Professor
Eskridge and the metaproceduralists, it is clearly not enough of a pedagogical
problem to eviscerate the overarching concept. And the overarching concept of
metaprocedure is to supplant traditional rules-proceduralism, or legal-process theory,
with the lessons of normativism.112
Thus, the nub of metaprocedure is to evaluate procedure critically through the
prism of substantive results. Explains Professor Eskridge:
The working assumption of the Cover, Fiss and Resnik book is not proceduralism, the
notion that good procedures are presumptive evidence of good results, but is instead
nonnativisn, the notion that good results (substantive justice) are presumptive evidence of
good procedures.
What troubles Cover, Fiss and Resnik about proceduralism is that its emphasis on process
threatens to sanction unjust results and to submerge critical debate over substantive
justice. 113
In locating metaprocedure as a reaction to the 1950s legal-process school and the
Field and Kaplan rules-formalism, Professor Eskridge makes a valuable contribution
to legal history. But when he further lapses into unfortunate rhetoric that caricatures
105. CovER, Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 9.
106. See Eskridge, supra note 51, at 947-48.
107. See id. at 947-51.
108. Id. at 948.
109. Id. at 950.
110. Id.
III. Id. at 954; see supra note 55.
112. Eskridge, supra note 51, at 964-73.
113. Id. at 964 (footnotes omitted).
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traditional formalism as inducing, supporting, and committing crimes of procedural
violence, 1 4 even the most open-minded academic's radar should signal something
very wrong, if not dangerous, in what the metaproceduralists are up to.
I have written elsewhere that metaprocedure is the lineal descendant of realism
and realist curricula reform stemming back to the 1920s, and I have concluded that
at worst it is ill-conceived and probably unteachable."15 But after reading Professor
Eskridge's essay, I am now convinced that it is dangerous. I say this for a variety of
reasons.
First, the metaproceduralists make no meaningful distinction between substance
and procedure while concomitantly failing to make any persuasive argument that all
procedure is, in reality, substantive. Surely there is some distinction," 6 and it seems
to me that if metaproceduralists want to stake their case on normativism, they are
obliged, at a minimum, to carry the latter argument. Professor Eskridge cites, as his
chief illustration of the so-called "violence of proceduralism," the lessons of Brown
v. Board of Education,17 but this illustration so stretches and distorts any concept of
procedure as to render the argument meaningless. The history of legal segregation is
a problem of substantive justice; the metaproceduralists transform every incorrect
substantive decision into a problem of defective process.
Second, metaprocedure's very ahistoricism undermines and invalidates the
critical posture assumed by its followers, and in refusing to view problems in
historical context, metaproceduralists are able to score quick and easy rhetorical
victories. For example, when Professor Eskridge views Brown v. Board of Education
out of historical context, he denies the doctrinal history that led to that decision, yet
he would have us understand that Brown demonstrates the failure or violence of
proceduralism. From the metaproceduralist perspective, only extrajudicial actions
impelled the Court finally to capitulate to desegregation." 8 This is one version of
history; but doctrinal history also demonstrates that a long series of decisions had
significantly eroded the separate-but-equal concept by the time the Court heard
Brown. The doctrinal history demonstrates that the courts had come to recognize that
114. See id. at 965, 967. Also unfortunate is Professor Eskridge's repeated use of what he calls the "Hobbesian
Paradigm" of adjudication to explain and distinguish the normativist approach to dispute resolution. See id. at 955-59,
961. Professor Eskridge means to describe a basically atomistic system, but his analogy to Hobbesian political theory
(most remembered for its colorful statement concerning the nastiness, brutality, and brevity of life), though clever, is
overwrought.
115. See generally Mullenix, Metaprocedure, supra note 7.
116. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 51, at 967: "Cover, Fiss, and Resnik provide many more examples of
supposedly neutral rules that are oppressive when viewed in social context, particularly in their violence to the poor, and
of procedural cases where the real issues are those of substantive justice."
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (discussed in Eskridge, supra note 51, at 965-67).
118. Eskridge, supra note 51, at 965, 973:
Hence, in a very real sense, adjudication was part of positive law's violence against black citizens. This
state-sponsored violence was in no way ameliorated by its procedural regularity, and Brown teaches that
meticulous procedures cannot validate morally squalid decisions.
... What eliminated state-sanctioned segregation was not the Supreme Court, but an ongoing interpretive
community (or perhaps several communities) of parents, civic activitists, ministers, lawyers, academics,
lobbyists, and journalists, who associated formally and informally to transform themselves and to transform the
social and political world that was (and to a great extent remains) morally wrong.
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separate is inherently unequal; but this chapter of legal history is missing from
metaprocedure, perhaps because it does not dovetail nicely with the antiformalist
thesis.
Third, and this is concededly a petulant objection, metaprocedure has developed
its own obscurantist nomenclature that is variously offensive, elitist, and at bottom,
ideological. The vocabulary of metaprocedure (morphogenesis, jurisgenesis, juris-
pathic, nomos)" 9 sets up good guys and bad guys in sophisticated terminology.
Basically, the metaproceduralists are the good guys who care about marginalized
persons and groups who are being violently assaulted (procedurally) by the bad guys,
the Field and Kaplan, Hart and Wechsler, Hart and Saks traditional legal-process
theorists. For a reformist movement bent on unmasking the ideological bases of
formalism, the metaproceduralists ought to be more honest about their own
intellectual agenda.
Fourth, evaluating procedure on the basis of normativism is absurd, presump-
tuous, and bound to fail. Professor Eskridge knows this; t20 he concedes that Professor
Fiss revised his own normative views over the years and that the three coauthors each
have different conceptions of normative philosophy.' 2' Thus, the three leading
expositors of metaprocedure cannot offer a reasonable normative construct, and
neither two thousand years of written history nor millions of philosophical words
have produced a coherent, agreed-upon normative vision.
The failure to provide a normative vision is a serious defect because it reduces
substantive justice to the personal perspective of the metaproceduralist, and in the
judicial arena, to judicial tyranny. 122 The problem is that if formalism inevitably
results in substantive injustice, then no rules will remedy the problem, and rule
reform is merely an exercise in futility. Furthermore, metaproceduralists cannot
escape the faint odor of moral righteousness that permeates their charges of
procedural violence. On balance, I would rather be assaulted by a proceduralist than
by a normativist; in the former instance, I would at least have the consolation that the
offense was not committed with a sense of moral rectitude. Yet that is precisely what
the metaproceduralists would do; they justify normative violence based on the
certitude of their superior knowledge of substantive justice.
Finally, metaprocedure is dangerous precisely because it is antiprocedure and
teaches the wrong things; it is nihilistic in its antiformalism and provides no
meaningful framework for students and future lawyers to think about positive law
reform. As has been said more eloquently by others, law professors ought not to be
in the business of teaching cynicism and disrespect for the law. 23 Yet metaprocedure,
119. See id. at 965, 970-71; see also supra note 114 (discussing the "Hobbesian Paradigm").
120. See id. at 968-71.
121. Id. at 967-73.
122. "'By making judges the arbiters of public values, Fiss' system is open to charges of judicial tyranny." Id. at
968.
123. See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); " OfLawand the River," and ofNihilism
and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985), a collection of correspondence commenting on the Carrington
article, including the famous response by Professor Fiss:
Law schools are professional schools, insomuch as they train people for a profession. But they are also academic
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irresponsibly and unskillfully taught, will do just that; when the teacher wrenches
procedure from history and charges it with substantive injustice, there is no reason to
respect rules or to create new or different rules. With relativistic (or even worse,
undefined) normativism as its central thesis, metaprocedure has created an impossi-
ble, if not destructive, task. The ultimate problem with metaprocedure-as long as
normativism supplies the evaluative measure for justice-is that there can be no
conceivable set of just rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the publication of the Hazard study on the state of scholarship in civil
procedure twenty-five years ago, much progress has been made in infusing a
historical perspective into procedural scholarship. Many contemporary writers are
developing themes exclusively in the study of the history of procedure, reclaiming
aspects of rulemaking history, doctrinal development, or particular cases. However,
much historical research still remains to be done across the broad spectrum of
individual rules; almost all the procedural problems identified in the Hazard study t2 4
still have eluded careful historical analysis.
While individual scholars have been cultivating historical roots, the trend among
casebook writers is to reduce inclusion of historical materials. Even for those
problems that rely heavily on history for their solution, such as the right to a jury trial,
the historical antecedents simply are disappearing from the casebooks. This gradual
shrinking of descriptive materials on law and equity deprives students of a necessary
context for apprehending not only civil procedure, but much of the substantive law
encountered in the first year of law school. To the extent that casebooks have become
increasingly ahistorical, this is a lamentable trend.
In general, legal scholarship has embraced the social sciences and, more
recently, the humanities through reflections on legal themes in literature. t25 History
and historians deserve a more thoughtful reception from proceduralists; students need
this procedural past as a prologue to their future.
institutions, and by that I mean they seek to discover the truth. We cannot shut off an avenue of inquiry, for fear
that it would render the professional training pointless-if the river does not exist, people should not be trained
for river piloting, at least not in the way that they have been. Every law school should confront the question
whether law exists, and it is of the essence of academic freedom to allow all sides to speak, even those who
would answer that question in the negative and thus recommend that our doors be closed and resources be used
for other purposes.
Id. at 24.
124. See supra note 40.
125. See, e.g., R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
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